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erred by refusing to apply OPA to inland areas. Since Congress used
the same language in both OPA and the Clean Water Act, the Rices
believed the scope of both scts should be similar. Thus, OPA should
apply to discharges into "waters of the United States," regardless of the
distance of those waters from an ocean or similar body of water. The
Rices also maintained the district court improperly excluded
groundwater from "waters of the United States." They claimed that
Congress, through OPA, intended to regulate all waters that could
affect interstate commerce. Accordingly, the Rices argued that OPA
should impose liability on facilities that discharge oil and related
wastes into any body of water, including groundwater, that affects
interstate commerce. The Rices contended that under the proper
interpretation of "navigable waters," they had a viable OPA claim since
Harken's discharges of oil affected surface water and groundwater
under the Ranch.
The Fifth Circuit stated OPA would have provided the Rices with a
remedy if they could have demonstrated that Harken discharged oil
into a navigable body of water or water adjacent to an open body of
navigable water. Nothing, however, in the record linked Big Creek or
any of the other creeks on the ranch to navigable water as to qualify
for protection under OPA. No evidence existed of any oil discharge
directly into Big Creek or any other intermittent creek containing
above ground water. Rather, the facts demonstrated Harken's various
discharges of oil were all onto dry land, some of which, over time, may
have seeped into groundwater and into Big Creek or another creek.
The court held a generalized assertion that gradual, natural seepage
from contaminated groundwater that will eventually affect covered
surface waters did not establish liability under OPA. Accordingly, the
Rices had no cause of action under OPA for discharges of oil that
contaminated only the groundwater under the Ranch, and the court
deemed summary judgment appropriate.
Kevin R. Rohnstock

NINTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 256 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding water rights can either be forfeited through five successive
years of nonuse, commencing with initiation of appropriation, or
abandoned due to proof of actual intent via indirect and
circumstantial evidence).
The town of Fernley ("Fernley") applied to the Nevada State
Engineer ("Engineer") to change the manner and place of use of
rights to roughly 280 acre-feet of water from the federal Newlands
Reclamation Project ("Project"). The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of
Indians ("Tribe") and the federal government opposed the proposed
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transfers, contending Fernley had forfeited or abandoned the water
rights at issue. The district court, affirming the decision of the
Engineer, held none of the water rights had been forfeited or
abandoned. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed and remanded for
further proceedings.
The Project diverts the flow of the Truckee and Carson Rivers to
supply the needs of water users in Nevada. The federal government
operates the Project, but individual landowners hold water rights in
the Project pursuant to contracts between the land-owners and the
Department of the Interior. The nature and extent of those water
rights are determined, in large part, by Nevada state law.
Fernley sought to satisfy its growing water needs by acquiring water
rights from the Project. Thus, Fernley filed an application with the
Engineer to change the manner and place of use of twenty-six separate
water use permits it had acquired. The Tribe resides on a half-million
acre reservation surrounding Pyramid Lake, which is dependent on
the flow of the Truckee River. Thus, the Tribe's economy, culture,
and heritage are linked to the size of the flow of the Truckee River and
to the health of Pyramid Lake. As such, the Tribe and the federal
government filed opposition to Fernley's application, contending the
water rights sought were either forfeited or abandoned.
The Engineer approved the transfer of all but a few of the water
rights at issue, maintaining Fernley was the bona fide owner of the
water rights, and the town paid the operation and maintenance fees
for those rights. Furthermore, the Engineer ruled all of the water
rights at issue were exempt from forfeiture, rejecting the argument the
non-forfeited water rights were abandoned.
Water rights can be lost either through forfeiture or abandonment,
with both established via a "clear and convincing evidence" standard.
In most cases, it is easier to establish forfeiture than abandonment
because forfeiture requires only a showing of five successive years of
non-use. However, forfeiture does not apply to water rights vested
prior to, or for which appropriations were initiated before 1913. The
Tribe and the federal government argued some of the water rights in
question were subject to forfeiture while Fernley claimed none of the
water rights were subject to forfeiture. The Ninth Circuit held the
Engineer erred in concluding all water rights were initiated when land
for the Project was withdrawn from public entry by the federal
government in 1902. Further, the court held the district court made
the same error when, in affirming the Engineer, it concluded that
because each individual Project water right has a priority date ofJuly 2,
1902, it was therefore initiated on that same date. Thus, the Engineer
was to determine "when the individual landowner took the 'first steps'
to appropriate the water appurtenant to his land, and not [to] rely on
the 1902 priority date." Failure to do so is deemed an abuse of
discretion.
If a water right is exempted from forfeiture, it may be lost only
through abandonment. Abandonment is the "relinquishment of the
right by the owner with the intention to forsake and desert it." Thus,
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abandonment requires a showing of actual intent, on the part of the
holder of a water right, to abdicate. Non-use can provide "some
evidence" of intent, but it is not by itself sufficient to establish
abandonment. Therefore, indirect and circumstantial evidence are
generally necessary to show abandonment. The Tribe asserted the
Engineer was wrong to consider payment of operation and
maintenance fees as sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
particular water rights had not been abandoned.
However,
abandonment is determined from all surrounding circumstancesincluding the payment of assessments and taxes. Other important
influences include non-use of the water right as well as the
construction of structures incompatible with irrigation. Thus, the
court concluded the Tribe failed to provide clear and convincing
evidence of abandonment.
Ultimately, the court reversed and remanded for further
proceedings. As such, the district court was ordered to review the
Engineer's forfeiture findings on a parcel-by-parcel basis, and to
incorporate into the record the evidence submitted to the Engineer
relevant to those findings.
Kimberley E. Montanaro
Mohave Valley Irrigation & Drainage Dist. v. Norton, 244 F.3d 1164
(9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Department of the Interior allotted
the correct amount of water to the Mohave Valley Irrigation and
Drainage District, and landowners who held present perfected rights
not only constituted parties to the contract, but also factored into the
water delivery calculation).
The Mohave Valley Irrigation and Drainage District ("District")
appealed a grant of summary judgment to the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior ("Department"), Gale Norton. The
District alleged the Department breached a 1968 contract allotting it
41,000 annual acre-feet of water. In response, the Department argued
ambiguity within the contract due to a lack of language explicitly
mentioning the entitlement received by landowners who held present
perfected rights ("PPRs").
The Department allotted water to the District by subtracting it, as
provided by the PPRs located within the District, from the amount
fixed by the contract. The district court agreed with the Department's
allotment system. The District appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, seeking the full allotment, as well as a
separate calculation for the PPRs. The court defined the contract
broadly, and held the omission of PPRs from the contract had the
effect of including those landowners as parties to the contract.
The District, under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"),
argued that the contract was ambiguous. Courts will only review

